Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Important? by Epstein, Lee et al.
Copyright  2007  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Vol.  101 




IDEOLOGICAL DRIFT AMONG SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES:  WHO, WHEN, AND HOW 
IMPORTANT? 
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal 
INTRODUCTION 
When the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Bush administration’s 
plan to use military commissions to try enemy combatants in Hamdan  v. 
Rumsfeld,1 the decision fueled more than a national debate over the powers 
of the President.  It also generated commentary about the ideological com-
position of the Court.  Conservatives proclaimed that they were just one 
Justice, just one vacancy, away from victory in Hamdan2 and a handful of 
other recent decisions that worked against their interests.3  Liberals worried 
about just as much.4
 
1  126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (link). 
2  The vote in Hamdan was five-to-three.  Because he served on the appellate court panel that had 
upheld the commissions, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (link), Chief Justice Rob-
erts recused himself.  Had he participated, many commentators assume he would have once again sup-
ported the administration.  See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Court’s Stunning Hamdan Decision, NEW 
REUBLIC ONLINE, June 30, 2006, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060626&s=sunstein063006 (link) 
(“The current Court itself remains badly divided.  We should emphasize that Hamdan was decided by a 
narrow margin of 5-3, and we should not neglect the fact that Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in 
the decision; the reason is that he was part of the three-judge lower court, now reversed, which had ruled 
broadly in the president’s favor.”).  
3  E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (link) (a five-four decision affirming the 
taking of property for economic development does not violate the “public use” restriction of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Taking Clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (link) (holding that a law 
school’s use of race in admissions decisions does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (link) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed when the defendant was under the 
age of eighteen). 
4  Commentary on Hamdan and the ideological composition of the Court appears on numerous 
blogs.  See, e.g., Applied Epistemology, http://appliedepistemology.com (June 29, 2006, 18:37 EST) 
(link) (“The scary lesson that Hamdan [sic] teaches us is that the only thing currently standing between 
American democracy and an executive branch autocracy is John Paul Stevens’ bath mat.”); Five, Wrong 
on Hamdan, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, June 30, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/ 
?q=NzZmOTBhMzFlY2VlMzI5NjYyNzMzZWVlNTAwNzZhMWM= (link) (“The Mystery Five [Jus-
tices] have simply practiced once again the utterly lawless willfulness that they have proclaimed to be 
their mission.  And they undoubtedly know that they will receive ample cover, in the form of fawning 
accolades, from legal academia and the liberal media.”).  
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The commentary over Hamdan reflects a widely shared belief among 
journalists, politicians, scholars, and even judges:  alterations in the Court’s 
jurisprudence are unlikely in the absence of membership change.  That is 
because the Justices themselves, according to these commentators, do not 
exhibit ideological change over the course of their tenure.5  To paraphrase 
the old proverb, once a conservative, always a conservative.  Likewise for 
liberals.6
Why the assumption of stable preferences is so deeply held is open to 
speculation.  Some analysts suggest it would defy logic to expect mature 
persons, with years of experience in the legal world, to revisit their juris-
prudential views.  Would a John G. Roberts, Jr.—a Justice who has studied, 
litigated, or adjudicated court cases for over half his life—alter his ideologi-
cal preferences?  The answer, according to Professor David A. Strauss, is 
that he would not: 
 As Americans try to figure out what Judge John G. Roberts Jr. will be like 
as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, one idea seems to [be] . . . that whatever 
Judge Roberts is now, once he is on the court he might develop into something 
different.  In particular, the thinking goes, even if he is the intense conservative 
suggested by his Reagan-era memoranda, he may become more moderate as a 
justice. 
 Don’t believe it.7  
Shoring up intuitions about the implausibility of preference change is 
empirical support in the form of a William H. Rehnquist on the right and a 
Thurgood Marshall on the left—Justices who never seemed to veer much 
from their preferred ideological course.  When President Richard Nixon ap-
 
5  We develop these points in our article to appear in the Northwestern University Law Review.  Ep-
stein et al., Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Important?, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).  Suffice it to note here that the claim of ideological consistency not 
only appears in commentary on the Court but undergirds many important theories of judicial decisions, 
or at least tests of those theories.  Consider “separation of powers” theories, which suggest that the Court 
takes into account the preferences and likely actions of Congress when it interprets statutes.  The typical 
assumption is that the sincere preferences of the Court do not change unless the center of the Court (the 
median) changes as a result of membership turnover.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Su-
preme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 378 (1991); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr.,  Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 
613, 643–45 (1991) (link); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Inde-
pendence:  The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–1988, 23 RAND 
J. ECON. 463, 466 (1992) (all three detailing how the Court’s sincere or raw preferences move with 
membership changes but explaining why the Court may not act on those preferences).  Likewise, some 
adherents of the attitudinal model of judicial decisions, which holds that justices vote on the basis of 
their ideology, describe attitudes as “relatively enduring.”  See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 75 (1976). 
6  The proverb is “Once a thief, always a thief.” 
7  David A. Strauss, It’s Time to Deal with Reality:  The Myth of the Unpredictable Supreme Court 
Justice Debunked, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2005, at C9 (link). 
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pointed Rehnquist to the Court, virtually all observers of the day deemed 
the nominee a reliable conservative.8  Likewise at the time of his appoint-
ment, the press declared Justice Marshall a probable addition to the Court’s 
“liberal bloc.”9  That these initial ideological labels well characterized the 
Justices’ future behavior only serves to confirm Professor Strauss’s claim 
about the unlikelihood of change.  Or so the argument goes. 
And yet, despite the commonplace nature of the claim, it is not without 
its share of skeptics.  Whether pointing to anecdotes or more systematic 
evidence, several analysts now contend that ideological drift is not just pos-
sible but likely.10  Exhibit A, they say, is Harry A. Blackmun.  While the 
Justice himself maintained that it was the Court, not he, that moved—“I 
don’t believe I’m any more liberal, as such, now than I was before,” Justice 
Blackmun once told a reporter11—many scholars disagree.12  To them, it is 
hard to believe that the same Justice who dissented from the Court’s 1972 
decision to strike down existing death penalty statutes,13 wrote, in 1994, 
“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death.”14
But is Justice Blackmun the rule or the rare exception?  Do most Jus-
tices remain committed to a particular doctrinal course throughout their ca-
reers, as Strauss and others contend, or do the skeptics have the better case?  
In our Article, forthcoming in the Northwestern University Law Review,15 
we deploy state-of-the-art methods to address these questions.  The results, 
as it turns out, are striking:  Contrary to the received wisdom, virtually 
every Justice serving since the 1930s has moved to the left or right or, in 
some cases, has switched directions several times.16
 
8  See, e.g., The Court Nominations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1971, at 38 (“Mr. Rehnquist [is] a Gold-
water conservative [with] a brilliant professional background but a questionable record on civil liber-
ties.”). 
9  Louis M. Kohlmeier, Thurgood Marshall Chosen for High Court; First Negro will Bolster Liberal 
Segment, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1967, at 3. 
10  See Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference 
Change, 70  MO. L. REV. 1209, 1220 (2005) (link) (a “small but emerging body of empirical literature 
suggests that preference change is a phenomenon which affects many Justices during the course of their 
careers”).  
11  Quoted in John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 20, 
1983, at 26. 
12  See, e.g., Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717, 717 
(1983) (“Harry A. Blackmun has undergone a remarkable transformation”); LINDA GREENHOUSE, 
BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 235 (2005) (present-
ing data documenting Blackmun’s movement.); Ruger, supra note 10, at 1212 (“[d]iverse evidence sug-
gests that . . . Blackmun . . . significantly changed”). 
13  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (link). 
14  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (link). 
15  Epstein et al., supra note 5. 
16  Epstein et al., supra note 5 (manuscript at 1, on file with Colloquy). 
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Finding that ideological drift is pervasive, we develop the implications 
of our results for the Justices’ appointment to the Court and the doctrine 
they develop once confirmed.  As to the first, we show that Presidents hop-
ing to create a lasting legacy in the form of Justices who share their ideol-
ogy can be reasonably certain that their appointees will behave in line with 
expectations—at least during the Justice’s first term in office.  But, even 
before hitting the first decade mark, most Justices fluctuate, leading to a 
degradation of the relationship between their preferences and their votes.  
The implication is clear:  the President and his supporters in the Senate may 
be unable to guarantee the “entrenchment” of their ideology on the Court in 
the long or even medium term.17  As a result, Presidents may be best off 
placing comparatively greater emphasis on advancing the interests of their 
political party—rather than their own ideological interests—through the ap-
pointment of Justices designed to appease particular constituencies. 
As for the development of doctrine, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, 
we find that ideological movement can manifest in important legal change.  
Consider Figure 1, which provides our estimates of the probability of Jus-
tice O’Connor siding with the University of Michigan Law School in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger18 and with the defendants in Lawrence v. Texas.19  Note that 
from about 1990 through 1999, that probability for Lawrence hovered 
around, but only occasionally surpassed, 0.50.  After the 1999 Term, the 
odds steadily increased such that a vote cast by O’Connor against Lawrence 
would have been unlikely.  On the other hand, the probability of a vote in 
favor of Bollinger does not rise above 0.50 until the 2002 Term—meaning 
that had Justice O’Connor’s initial preferences remained stable, odds are 
that she would not have provided the fifth vote to uphold Michigan Law 
School’s affirmative action program.  The implications of findings of this 
 
17  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (2001) (link), who explain their theory of partisan entrenchment in the follow-
ing terms:  
When a party wins the White House, it can stock the federal judiciary with members of its own 
party, assuming a relatively acquiescent Senate.  They will serve for long periods of time because 
judges enjoy life tenure.  On average, Supreme Court Justices serve about eighteen years.  In this 
sense, judges and Justices resemble Senators who are appointed for 18-year terms by their parties 
and never have to face election.  They are temporally extended representatives of particular par-
ties, and hence, of popular understandings about public policy and the Constitution.  The temporal 
extension of partisan representation is what we mean by partisan entrenchment.  
(internal citations omitted). 
As other scholars have recognized, a finding of widespread preference change could present a chal-
lenge to theories of partisan or, especially, ideological entrenchment.  See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY 
A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT:  THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT 141 (2005) (“Whether or 
not packing the courts is a laudable goal, a variety of factors can conspire against presidents seeking to 
achieve it,” including “changing attitudes.”); Ruger, supra note 10, at 1211 (“The possibility that judi-
cial preferences might vary significantly over time compels reconsideration of . . . entrenchment the-
ory.”).  
18  539 U.S. 306 (2003) (link). 
19  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (link). 
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sort are many, not the least of which is that attorneys’ expectations about 



















Figure 1:  The estimated probability of a liberal vote by Justice O’Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger and 
Lawrence v. Texas over time.  These predicted probabilities are based on the stastitical model we de-
scribe in the full Northwestern Law Review article. 
 
We conclude with a discussion of the prospects for legal change among 
the Justices of the Roberts Court.  Here we consider two plausible scenar-
ios, one in which the current Justices remain relatively true to their current 
doctrinal inclinations and another in which members move.  Either way, we 
find that legal change (or, in some instances, surprising stability) may be 
possible—a finding that defies contemporary expectations about the inertia 
of Justices and, by implication, the Court in the absence of membership 
turnover. 
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